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In  its  Framework  Communication(!)  on  the  consequences  of  the  Chernobyl 
accident,  the  Commission  reviewed  the policy implications of  those  events  and 
declared its intentions with respect  to necessary actions  to be  taken.  Since 
the  communication  a  number  of  the  actions  foreseen  have  already  been  taken 
(e.g.  the  publication  of  the  Commission's  proposals  for  development  of 
measures  for  application  of  Chapter  III  of  the  Euratqm  Treaty  (COM  (86) 
434));  other actions are  in course of preparation. 
The  foregoing  activities  and  communications  relate  ·to  policy  questions  and 
initiatives.  Hitherto,  the  Commission  has  not  published  any  general 
description of  the events before  and  after the  accident~ which -constitute the 
background  against  which  actions  in  the  Community  framework  are  set.  This 
communicatio~  fulfils  that  purpose.  Its  nature  is  purely  descriptive, 
intended  to provide  the reader with a  general orientation.  The  document  does 
not · have  any  policy  implications  thea~  being  reserved  to  the  other 
communications  foreshadowed  in the Framework  Communication. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
On  26  April  1986  a  major  accident  in  the  No.  4  Unit  at  the  Chernobyl  nuclear 
power  plant set in train a  sequence of  damaging  events whose  impact,  although 
most  severe  in  the  Soviet  Union.  extended  throughout  Europe  and  beyond. 
Initially,  information  on  all of  the multitudinous  events precipitated by  the 
accident  was  limited.  part:Lt:ularly  as  regards  conditions  and  activities  in 
the  region  surrounding  the  damaged  reactor.  Because  of  this  lack of  public 
information,  the  Commission  was  requested  to  prepare  a  report  on  the various 
events  related  to  the  accident  which  have  relevance  to  the  interests  of  the 
Community  and  its  citizens.  This  report  has  been  prepared  in  response  to 
that  request.  Information  sufficient  to  allow  a  balanced  report  to  be  made 
did  not  become  available  to  the  Commission  until  the  major  information 
release  made  by  the  Soviet  delegation  to  the  IAEA  post  accident  review 
meeting,  25-29  August. 
The  report  gives  summary  accounts of  the principal events  in  the  accident  and 
post-accident  periods,  both  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  in  the  Community.  The 
time  period  reported,  from  the  time  of  the  accident  until  late  September  is 
divided  between  the  period  of  tactical  response  to  the  accident  induced 
events  and  the  later  period  of  strategic  actions  intended  to  reduce  future 
accident  probability  and  improve  the  Community's  capability  to  deal  speedily 
and  effectively  with  the  consequences  of  any  nuclear  accident  which  might 
take place.  Some  discussion of  issues for  the future  is included. 
The  report  concentrates  upon  events  and  actions  directly  related  to  the 
Chernohyl  accident  'and  i ~s  effects.  It covers  only  paff) of.  the  range  of · 
issues raised  in the  Commission's  Framework  Commuriicati?n  :·,  •  . 
(1)  COM  (86)  327  final  - referred  to here and hereafter as "the Framework 
Communication". 
I 
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2.  THE  NUCLEAR  CONTEXT 
2.1.  The  Status of Nuclear  Energy  in the USSR  and  Eastern  Europe 
At  present,  the  installed nuclear capacity in  the  USSR  has  reached  30  GWe. 
Nuclear  power  plants  produce  close  to  15%  of  the  total  electricity 
requirement.  A  further  capacity  of  29  GWe  is  reported  to  be  under 
construction.  Most  of  the  plants  are  located  in  the  European  region  of 
the  USSR,  which  has  only very  limited  fossil  fuel  resources  and  where  the 
cost  of  transporting  fossil  materials  from  Siberia  and  the  Asian 
territories is felt  to be  prohibitive. 
The  Soviet  nuclear  programme  is  mainly  based  on  two  reactor 
graphite-moderated  boiling  water  cooled  reactors  (RBMKs). 
Chernobyl.  and  pressurised  light-water  moderated  and  cooled 
(VVERs).  RBMK  reactors have  not been exported by  the USSR. 
types 
such  as 
reactors 
According  to  the  Soviet  Union's  energy  programme,  nuclear  power  should 
cover  most  of  the  economy's  increased  requirements;  maximum  possible  use 
of  nuclear  fuel  for  centralising  heating  and  industrial heat  is  planned. 
It is  expected  that  nuclear  power  will  be  developed  extremely  rapidly  in 
the  European  part  of  the  country  and  in  the  Urals.  The  nuclear  power 
plants  being  built  in  USSR  are  based  on  the  VVER  1000  (PWR,  1000  MWe), 
RBMK  (including  increased  power  versions),  fast  breeder  reactors  and 
possibly HTGR  types . 
. .  '.) .·. 
The  COMECON  countries  1 
reactors  from  Canada, 
co-production  agreement 
power  plant  equipment. 
with· the  exception  of  Rumania  which  ordered  two 
have  signed  a  multilateral  specialisation  and 
with  the  USSR  for  the  mutual  supply  of  nuclear 
Nuclear reactors are operating at present  in Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,  the 
German  Democratic Republic  and  Hungary.  The  total capacity  amounts  to  6,7 
GWe.  A further  capacity  of  8,2 GWe  is reported  to  be  under  construction, 
with Poland  and  Rumania  joining the countries already mentioned.  With  the 
exception of  Rumania,  these nuclear  programmes  are all based  on  the  Soviet 
VVER  reactor  type. 
2.2.  The  Status of Nuclear  Energy  in the  European  Community 
Although  the  position  in  the  different  Member  States varies  considerably, 
nuclear  energy  is used  for  electricity production  on  a  large scale in  the 
European  Community. 
Belgium,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  the 
Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom  rely  in  varying  degrees  on  nuclear 
energy.  Denmark,  Greece,  Ireland, Luxembourg  and  Portugal do  not. 
The  most  common  reactor  type  is  the  light  water  reactor  (pressurised  or 
boiling).  Gas  graphite  reactors  and  fast  breeder  reactors  are  used  to  a 
lesser extent. 
The  contribution  of  nuclear  energy  has  grown  impressively  since  the  first 
oil price  shock  in  1973,  when  nuclear  power  plants  accounted  for  only  5 (2) 
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per  cent  of  net  electricity  production.  By  1986,  the  nuclear  share  will 
hAve  multiplied  by  a  factor  of  7  to  account  for  35  per  cent  of 
electricity,  or  more  than  13  per  cent  oi--i6~al  energy  consumption. 
Nuclear  c~pacity  currently  amounts  to  73  GWe,  more  than  twice  that 
currently  operational  in  the  USSR  and  provides  the  energy  equivalent  of 
more  than  100  million tonnes  of oil per year. 
Further  nuclear  installations  with  a  total  capacity  of  30  GWe  are  under 
construction. 
It  is  expected  that  nuclear  energy  will  contribute  40%  to  electricity 
generation  by  1990.  Taking  account  of  the  substantial  part  played  by 
nuclear  power  on  the  Community's  ~~rgy supply,  the  Council  agreed  in  its-
Resolution  of  16  September  1986  that,  on  the  basis  of  the" highest 
standards  of  safety,  appropriate measures  must  ensure  that all aspects  of 
planning,  construction  and  operation  of  nuclear  installations  fulfil 
optimal  safety conditions. 
2.3.  The  Status of Nuclear  Energy  in Other  European Countries 
With  particular  regard  to  Western  European  countries  outside  the 
Community,  there  is  a  considerable  use  of  nuclear  energy  in  Switzerland, 
Sweden  and  Finland. 
In  Switzerland.  five  nuclear  power  stations  are  in  operation;  the  total 
:f.ns talled .nuclear capacity reaches  2, 900  MWe. 
In  Sweden,  the nuclear programme  has been statutorily restricted in scope, 
but  it  is  very  substantial:  12  reactors  currently  provide  an  installed 
capacity of  9450  MWe,  some  60%  of  total generating capacity.  The  decision 
has  been  taken  to phase out  the use of nuclear power  by  2010. 
Finland  has  four  nuclear  power  plants  at  its  disposal,  with  a  total 
capacity of  2200  MWe. 
Norway  and  Austria,  on  the contrary,  do  not  use nuclear  energy. 
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3.  THE.  EVENTS  OF  THE  ACCIDENT  AND  ITS  IMMEDIATE  CONSEQUENCES 
(3) 
3.1.  The  Soviet  Report  on  the Chernobyl  Accident 
This  is  a  summary  of  the  conference  document  submitted  by  the  Soviet 
delegation  to  the  IAEA  post-accident  review meeting  25-29  August  and  based 
upon  material  assembled  by  the  Soviet  Government  Commission  on  the  causes 
of  the  accident  at  the  fourth  unit  of  the  Chernobyl  Nuclear  Power  Plant 
and·  on  its  consequences.  Comments  and  interpretations  by  the  Commission 
services have been  reduced  to the minimum  required for clarity. 
a)  Events Leading  to the Accident 
The  accident  took  place  on  26  April  1986  at  1.23  a.m.  prior  to 
shutdown  of  the  unit  for  planned  maintenance.  during  the  execution  of 
a  test.  There  was  a  sudden  power  surge  in  the  reactor  due  to 
introduction  of  excess  reactivity  1  leading  to  the  destruction  of  the 
reactor  and  part  of  the  building  in  which  it  was  housed  and  to  the 
release  into  the  atmosphere  of  part  of  the  radioactive  fission 
products which had  accumulated  in the core. 
The  Chernobyl  Nuclear Power Plant  (NPP)  consists of  four  operating units 
and  two  units  in .construction.  Each  unit  is  equipped  with  a  reactor 
type  RBMK  1000.  having  a  thermal  power  output  of  about  3200  MW;  the 
corresponding  electric  power  is  1000  MW.  The  RBMK  1000's  main 
features  are  core  composed  of  vertical  channels  containing  the 
fuel  rods  cooled · by · boiling  light-water.  graphite  moderator  between 
the  channels.  forced  circulation  coolant  loop.  steam ·.generated 
directly and  fed  to  the  two  500  MWe  turbogenerators. 
Confinement  of  radioactive  emission  in  accidents  involving  loss  of 
integrity  of  components  of  the  coolant  circulation  loop  is  provided 
by  locating  most  of  these  components  in  reinforced  over-pressure 
resistant compartments  of  the main  reactor building. 
Over  the  period  1973  to  1985,  14  RBMK-1000  reactors  were  put  in 
operation,  with  a  power  generating  capacity  of  13,000  MWe  (out  of  a 
total of nuclear generating capacity in USSR  of  30,000 MWe). 
The  fourth  unit  of  the  Chernobyl  NPP  went  into  operation  in  December 
1983.  At  the  fuel  burn-up  conditions  existing  when  the  accident 
occurred,  the void  coefficient of  the  reactor core was  positive  (i.e.  an 
increase  of  the  steam  content  in  the water  flowing  through  the  channels 
causes  a  simultaneous  increase  of  the  neutron  flux  and.  as  a 
consequence,  of  the  energy  produced  in  the  fuel);  this  physical 
characteristic,  very  important  from  the  standpoint  of('J)eactor  control 
and  safety, had  a  leading role in the accident  dynamics  • 
The  aim  of  the  planned  test  was  to  verify  the  possibility  of 
utilising  the  electric  energy  produced  by  a  turbogenerator  during  its 
run-down,  following  its  cut-off  from  the  steam  supply.  to  sustain 
temporarily the unit's essential electrical loads  up  to  the start up 
The  RBMK  is not  the  only  important  type of  reactor with  a  positive void 
coefficient;  however it is the  only  such reactor  type  designed  to have 
a  boiling coolant. -6-
of  the  emergency  diesel  generators.  Similar  tests  had  already  been 
carried out at  the Chernobyl plant.  The working  programme  to perform this 
test  had  not  been  properly  prepared  and  had  not  received  the  requisite 
approval;  safety  aspects  had  not  received  the  necessary  attention.  The 
operating staff were  not  adequately'prepared for  the test and  had  not been 
made  aware  of  the  possible  dangers.  Moreover  the  staff departed  from  the 
programme  during  execution of  the  test  and  thereby  created  the  conditions 
\\;)t:i:c:::::t:f the  Accidental  Sequence 
\ 
_,  On  25  April  at  0100  hours.  commencement  of  decreasing  the  reactor 
power.  to  prepare  the  unit  for  the  tests  and  the  planned 
shut-down.  ~  :i: 
At  1400  hours.  when  the  reactor  thermal  power  was  1600  MW •  one 
turbogenerator  having  been  stopped.  the  emergency  core  cooling· 
system  (ECCS)  was  switched  off.  in  accordance  with  the  test 
programme.  However.  the  preparation  of  the  unit  for  the  test  was 
suspended  until  2310  hours  because  of  a  request  from  the  competent 
electricity  supply  grid  control  office  for  continuation  of 
electrical  power  supply  from  Chernobyl  no.  4.  The  unit  continued 
operation  with  the  ECCS  isolated.  in  violation  of  the  operating 
rules. 
At  2310  hours.  the  power 
reference value fot  the test. 
decrease  was  resumed.  to·  meet  the 
i.e.  a  thermal power  of  700-1000  MW. 
On  26  April.  at  0028  hours.  the  operator  having  switched  off  the 
local  power  control  system.  had  difficulty  in  controlling  reactor 
thermal  power,  which  dropped  below  30  MW.  Only  at  0100  hours 
could  the  reactor  be  brought  to  200  MW;  a  further  increase 
towards  the  level  specified  for  the  test  was  hindered  by  the 
smallness  of  the  excess reactivity of  the  core.  due  to the  continuing 
'ipoisoning"  of  the  core  consequent  upon  the  previous  drop  of  the 
power  to  very  low  levels.  The  excess  reactivity  at  this  moment  was 
substantially  below  the  level  specified  in  operating  regulations; 
even  so •  it  was  decided  to  continue  the  test.  in  violation  of  the 
requirements  both of  the test programme  and  of  the operating rules. 
At  0103  and  0107  hours.  two  additional  circulation  pumps  of  the main 
coolant  loop  were  switched  on.  according  to  the  test  programme.  As 
the  power  level  was  substantially  lower  than  that  planned,  the 
resulting  coolant  flow  was  excessive;  in  consequence  some 
important  thermohydraulic  parameters  (steam  pressure  and  water 
level  in  the  separator)  changed  to  levels  at  which  automatic 
shutdown  (scram)  of  the  reactor  normally  occurs.  To  prevent  the 
reactor  scram  (and  interruption  of  the  test)  the  staff  blocked 
this  automatic  emergency  protection.  At  the  same  time  core 
poisoning  was  progressing  and  the  reactivity  continued  to  drop 
slowly. 
At  01.22.30  the available excess reactivity had  decreased  to  a  level 
requiring  immediate  reactor  shut-down.  Nevertheless  the  next  stage 
of  the test was  started. -7-
01.23.04  Shut-off  of  the  steam  supply  to  the  second 
turbogenerator  with  the  reactor  operating  at  200  MW.  The  staff 
had  blocked  the  automatic  scram  which  normally  results  from  the 
switching-off  of  both  turbogenerators;  their  intention  was  to 
maintain  the  reactor  at  power  so  that  it would  be  possible  to  repeat 
the  test  if  the  first  attempt  proved  unsuccessful.  This  meant  a 
further departure  from  the test  schedule. 
The  coolant  flow  started  to  reduce  slowly,  following  the  decrease 
of  speed  of  the  4  circulation  pumps  (out  of  a  total  of  8  operating 
pumps)  which  were  supplied  from  the  turbogenerator  which  was 
running  down. 
01.23.31  . The  flow  decrease  caused  an  increase  of  coolant 
temperature  leading  to  increased  boiling  and  steam  voids  with  a 
consequent  increase  of  reactivity  which  the  automatic  regulation 
was  incapable  of  compensating;  the  reactor  power  began  to  rise 
slowly. 
01.23.40  The  shift  head  gave  the  order  to  press  the  scram  button, 
which  would  send  all  the  safety  and  control  rods  into  the  core. 
The  rods  began  to  enter but,  after  a  few  seconds,  a  number  of  shocks 
were  felt  and  the  operator  saw  that  the  absorber  rods  had  halted 
without  fully  reaching  the  lower  stops.  He  then  cut  off  the  current 
to  the  sleeves  of  the  servo  drives  so  that  the  rods  would  fall  into 
the core under  their own  weight. 
01.24  Approximately,  according  to  observers  outside  unit  4,  two 
successive  explosions  occurred.  Burning  lumps  of  material  shot  in 
to  the  air  above  the  reactor,  some  of  which  fell  into  the  roof  of 
the machine  room  and  started  a  fire. 
c)  Soviet  Analysis  of  the Accident  Sequence 
An  analysis  of  the  accident  was  performed  using  complex  mathematical 
models.  Very  little measured  data  is  available  relating  to  the  final 
moments  leading  up  to  the  core  disruption.  As  regards  the  final  few 
seconds,  the  appearance  of  high  power  and  short  period  alarms  showed 
that  the  insertion  of  the  safety  rods  and  the  insertion  of  the  control 
rods  (which  were  at  that  moment  almost  fully  extracted  due  to  the  low 
excess  reactivity and,  as  a  consequence,  ineffective at the beginning of 
their movement)  were  inadequate  to  neutralise  the  power  surge  caused  by 
the  progressive  increase  of  the  steam  voids  in  the  channels.  The 
continuous  reactivity  increase,  a  consequence  of  the  continuing  growth 
of  steam voids,  caused  a  further  excursion.  fuel  fragmentation,  leading 
to  a  vapour  explosion which  destroyed  the channels.  Further explosions, 
destroyed  the  reactor  and  part  of  the  building  and  released  radioactive 
fission products  to  the  environment. 
d)  Measures  taken after the Accident 
Fighting  the  fire:  fires  had  broken  out  in  over  30  places  as  a 
result  of  the  explosions  of  the  reactor  which  had  ejected 
fragments  of  its core,  heated  to  high  temperature.  The  fires  on  the 
roof  of  the  reactor  section  had  been  overcome  by  0210  hours.  All 
fires were  out  at  0500  hours. -8-
Limiting the  Consequences  of the Accident 
•  The  damaged  reactor  was  covered  by  about  5.000  t  of  material 
(boron  compounds,  dolomite,  lead,  sand,  clay  dropped  from 
helicopters);  this  layer  covering  the  reactor  strongly  absorbed 
aerosol  particles,  ensured  shutdown  of  the  reactor  and  reduced 
gamma  radiation  • 
•  to  reduce  the  fuel  temperature  and  reduce  oxygen  concentration 
(to  stop  graphite  burningL  nitrogen  was  pumped  under  pressure 
into  the  space  beneath  the  reactor  vault;  by  6  May,  a  stable 
convective  flow  of  air  through  the  core  into  the  open  atmosphere 
had  been established  • 
•  as  a  precaution  against  the  remote  risk  of  a·. penetration  of  the 
fuel  (if  melted)  through  the  lower  reactor  structure,  a  concrete 
slab was  constructed  beneath the foundations  of  the building  • 
•  Since  the  end  of  May,  a  significant  degree  of  stabilisation  has 
taken  place  concerning  the  temperatures  in  the  reactor  vault  and 
reactor  core,  the  uptake  of  radioactivity  from  the  unit  into  the 
atmosphere  and  the  exposure  dose  rate  in  the  areas  around  the 
reactor.  The  protective  slab  beneath  the  unit  is  intact  and  the 
fuel is mostly  (96%)  localised within the reactor vault. 
Unit  3,  technically  linked  with  the  damaged  unit  4,  suffered 
practically  no  damage  ·from  the  explosion  and  was  shut  down  at  0500 
hours  on  26  April,  more  than  3  1/2  hours  after the accident.  Units  1 
and  2  were  shut  down  early on  27  April. 
After  decontamination  of  the  site  and  the  entombment  of  the  unit 
4,  it  is  intended  that  units  1  and  2  should  resume  operation  again 
before the  end  of  1986.  (Unit  1  resumed  operation end  September.) 
Decontamination  of  the  site  is  being 
decontaminating  buildings  surfaces,  removal  of 
soil,  covering  with  concrete,  coating  of  the 
with film-forming  compounds,  etc. 
carried  out  by 
5-10  em  layer  of 
non-concrete  areas 
Entombment  of  the  fourth  unit  is  intended  to  ensure  a  normal 
radiation situation in the surrounding area  and  in the  atmosphere  and 
preclude escape of  radioactivity into the environment.  (Construction 
of  the  entombment  structure is virtually complete.) 
In  June,  the  construction  of  a  complex  of  hydraulic  engineering 
structures  began  with  a  view  to  protect  the  ground  water  and  the 
surface water in the nuclear power plant area  from  contamination. 
e)  Environmental Contamination 
The  evolution  of  released  airborne  radionuclides  was  followed  from  26 
April  onward,  by  systematic  analysis  of  aerosol  and  fall-out  samples 
and  by aerial gamma  survey of  the plant area. -':J-
A  total  release  of  about  50  MCi  corrected  to  equivalent  value  on  6  May 
and  excluding  noble  gases  was  estimated  to  have  occurred.  From  the 
radiochemical  composition  of  the  released  nuclides  it  appears  that 
approximately  3.5%  of  the  core  inventory  of  fission  products  was 
released,  as  fine  fuel  particles;  about  one  half  of  it was  redeposited 
on  the  surroundings  of  the  plant.  Volatile  fission  products  were 
released  in  higher  quantities  (iodine  20%,  cesium  10-13%,  noble  gases 
100%). 
Significant  release  continued  for  about  ten  days,  being  highest  at  the 
beginning  and  the  end  of  the  period.  This  variation  was  largely  a 
result of  the accident  containment  measures  described at  3.1.d)  above. 
A  site  and  regional  monitoring  program  was  set  up,  including 
radioecological  and  biomedical  analyses,  to  assess  the  radiological 
exposure  of  plant  personnel  and  population  and  to  recommend  protection 
measures.  Monitoring  included levels of  gamma  radiation  in contaminated 
areas,  concentration  of  biologically  significant  radionuclides  in  air. 
water,  soil, vegetation and  food  products.  and  internal contamination of 
people. 
The  water  bodies  were  also  monitored.  Iodine-131  reached  1000  Bq/1  in 
the  Kiev  water  reservoir  on  May  3.  Total  radioisotope  concentration in 
the reservoir was  about  4  Bq/1  on  10-12  June. 
f)  Health Effects upon  Plant Personnel and  the General Population in the 
Soviet  Union 
About  200  persons  at  the  Chernobyl  plant  received  whole  body  gamma 
irradiation  and/or  suffered  burns  due  to  beta  rays  and  to  steam  and 
fire.  These  persons  were  rapidly  transported  to  specialised  hospitals 
and  cared  for  by  an  experienced  medical  team.  The  combination  of  bone 
marrow  damage  with  the  extensive  burns  presented  difficult  problems  of 
management.  Altogether  31  persons  died  from  the  acute  sequels  of  the 
accident  (Table  1).  A  substantial  percentage  of  those  would  probably 
have  died  in any  case  from  the extensive skin burns  due  to radiation and 
heat.  Treatment  of  the  general  radiation  syndrome  was  primarily 
conventional,  i.e.  maintenance  in  ad-hoc  aseptic  units,  preventive 
administration  of  antibiotics  to  reduce  bacterial  contamination  of  the 
intestine  and  to  treat  infections,  blood  platelet  transfusions  to  avoid 
bleeding.  Bone  marrow  transplantation  was  not  very  useful  in  these 
cases.  Burns were  treated by  local and  generalised  treatment. 
TABLE  1  :  NUMBER  OF  VICTIMS  TREATED  AND  DOSES 
Degree of 
Severity 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
Dose  Range 
Gy 
1- 2 
2- 4 
4- 6 
6-16 
TOTAL 
Number  at 
Kiev  Moscow 
14  31 
10  43 
2  21 
,2  20 
143 
Deceased 
0 
1  (not  from  radiation?) 
7  (6 with heavy  skin injury) 
21  (burns  40-60%  of  body  surface) 
29  (+2  diins immediateli) 
,; 
., 
I 
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Countermeasures  in  the  population  in  the  30km  zone  most  heavily  exposed  to 
fallout  were  considered  soon  after the  accident:  stable  iodine  tablets were 
distributed  among  workers  and  residents  around  Chernobyl  and  successfully 
reduced  uptake  of  radioactive  iodine  by  the  thyroid.  When  it  became  clear 
that  the  population  in  the  30km  zone  around  the  plant might  receive  doses  of 
the  order  of  several  hundred  mSv,  about  135,000  persons,  many  of  them 
children,  were  evacuated.  This  was  carried  out  rapidly  and  efficiently,  and 
nobody  outside  the  plant  thus  suffered  from  acute  radiation  syndrome.  The 
collective  dose  received  by  the  population  in  the  30km  zone  is estimated  at 
16,000  manSv.  Based  on  the  UNSCEAR  (United  Nations  Scientific  Committee  on 
the  Effects  of  Atomic  Radiation)  total  risk  estimate  of  0.01  extra  cancers 
per  Sv,  the  Soviet  authorities  estimated  the  relative  increase  in  cancer 
incidence at about  0.6%. 
Doses  to  the  Soviet  population  decreased  with  distance  from  the  plant 
and  depended  on  local  meteorological  conditions.  The  collective  dose 
commitment  from  external  exposure  as  a  consequence  of  the  Chernobyl 
accident  to  75  million  inhabitants  of  the  European  part  of  the  Soviet 
Union  is  estimated  at  90,000  manSv  for  the  first  year  and  290,000  manSv 
for  the  subsequent  SO  years.  The  collective  dose  commitment  from  intake 
of  radionuclides,  largely  a  result  of  caesium  radionuclides  in  food,  was 
pessimistically  evaluated  at  about  2.000.000  manSv  but,  according  to 
other  calculations  and  preliminary  measurements  of  radioactive  body 
burdens,  may  be as much  as  a  factor .of  ten  lower,. 
, .. 
3. 2.  Events  in the  Framework  of  the  Eu-ropean  Communi_t_f 
During  the  period  which  followed  the  Chernobyl  event,  numerous  actions  tP 
monitor  conditions  and  ,protect  citizens  from  the· effects  of  contamination 
were  undertaken  b.Y  national  authorities.  The  Comm-ission  does  not  dispose 
of  complete  information  on  these  actions  which,  nevertheless,  represent 
the  major  part  of  the  immediate  response  to  the  post-accident  situation. 
The  ensuing  description  is  confined  to  those  events  which  took  place 
within the  framework  of  the  European  Communi;,_y. 
In  structuring  the  presentation,  a  question arises  as  to  the distinction which 
should  be  made  between  the  immediate  consequences  and  longer  term  events  and 
actions.·  For  convenience,  Community  events  up  to  the  date  on  which  the 
Commission  adopted  its  Framework  Communication  are  treated  as  part  of  the 
immediate  sequence  of  events;  subsequent  events  are  reported  in  Section  4. 2 
"Measures  in the  framework  of  the  European  Community". 
3.2.1.  Chronology 
The  following  is a  simple  chronology of main  events  : 
26  April:  Accident  at  the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. 
28  A~ril:  10.00  hrs.  First  radioactive  fallout  is  detected  on 
Community  territory at Ris8,  Denmark. 
29  AJ2ril:  Commission  requests Member  States to provide  information on 
radioactivity  .levels  in  their  territories  pursuant  to 
Articles  35  and  36  of  the  Euratom Treaty. 2  May: 
6  May: 
~: 
12  May: 
20  May: 
22  May: 
30 May: 
5  June: 
12  June: 
-11-
First  results  on  contamination  both  of  food  and  of 
environment  become  available via the  rapid alert system  for 
food. 
Commission  proposes  a  Council  Regulation  to  tempora.rily 
suspend  imports  of  certain  agricultural  products 
(foodstuffs)  from  some  Eastern European  countries. 
Commission  adopts  Recommendation  No.  86/156/EEC  on  limits 
of  contamination  of  certain  agricultural  products 
(foodstuffs)  for  the  internal  market  and  on  reciprocal 
recognition of controls by Member  States. 
Commission  adopts  Decision  No  86/157/EEC  temporarily 
suspending  the  imports  of  some  livestock  and  fresh  meat 
from  certain Eastern European countries. 
Council  adopts  Regulation  No  1388/86  suspending  imports  of 
certain  agricultural  products  (foodstuffs)  from  certain 
Eastern European countries until  31  May  1986. 
Report  is transmitted  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  as 
required  by  Article  5  of  Council  Regulation  No  1388/86  on 
the development  of  the situation. 
Commission  proposes  a  Council  Regulation  to  fix  limits  of 
caesium contamination in food  imports  from all countries. 
Council  adopts  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1707/86  on  conditions 
governing  imports  of  agricultural  products  and  processed 
foods  originating  in  all  third  countries.  The  Regulation 
fixes  limits  for  caesium  radioisotopes  and  expires  on  3'0 
September  1986. 
Commission  adopts  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1762/86  laying  down 
detailed  rules  for  the  application  of  Council  Regulation 
(EEC)  No  1707/86  on  the  imports  of  agricultural  products 
and  processed  foods. 
Commission  transmits 
Communication  on  the 
accident. 
to  the  Council  a 
consequences  of  the 
Framework 
Chernobyl 
3.2.2.  Problems  of  Radiation Fallout  from  Chernobyl within  the Community 
With  the  detection  of  increased  radioactivity  levels  in  air  in  Sweden, 
and  later in  the  Community,  national  authorities  in Member  States  began 
an  extensive  monitoring  of  the  environment.  Rainfalls  over  significant 
parts  of  the  Community  during  the  passage  of  the  radioactive  plume 
(27  April  - 12  May)  led  to  sigt).ificant,  but  uneven,  deposition  of 
radiologically  important nuclides,  notably  iodine  and  caesium. 
Recognising  the  potential  ~anger and  in accordance with Articles  35  and 
36  of  the  Euratom ·Treaty, ·the  Commission  'requested  on  29  April,  1986, 
• (4) 
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from  Member  States  the  regular  communication  of  monitoring  data  on 
radioactivity  in  air.  water.  soil  and  foodstuffs.  Information  on 
contamination was  exchanged  on  a  daily basis  between  national  competent 
authorities.  It  soon  became  apparent  that  air  and  surface  water 
radioactivity was  not  such  as  to  cause  concern.  Attention was  focussed 
instead  on  the  contamination  of  agricultural  products  used  for  human 
consumption which became  the major exposure  pathway. 
Because  they  became  a  major  preoccupation  for  the  Community. 
administrative  problems  and  measures  relating  to  contamination  of 
foodstuffs  are described  separately in section 3.2.2.1 below. 
The  major  release  of  activity  from  Chernobyl  lasted  for  about  10  days. 
i.e.  from  26  April  to  5  May.  During  this  period  the  meteorological 
conditions  over  Europe  changed  considerably  and  as  a  consequence  the 
dispersion of  radioactive material across  Europe was widespread but very 
uneven;  in  particular  the  pattern  of  radionuclide  deposition  on  the 
ground was  greatly affected by  the occurrence of localised rainfalls. 
The  release  of  26  April  reached  Scandinavia  on  the  27th  and  28th,  that 
of  27  April  spread  further  southwards  passing  through  the  Federal 
Republic of Germany  and  France before  turning northeastwards  to  Belgium. 
the  Netherlands,  the  UK  and  Ireland.  The  releases  of  29  and  30  April 
travelled  to  the  South-East  to Northern  Italy before  moving  northwards. 
On  1  and  2  May  the  radioactive  plume  carried  towards  Greece.  The 
releases  of  3  and  4  May  passed  towards  the  North-West  and  had  no 
immediate  impact  on  Member  States:  however.  subsequent  releases  on 
5  May  travelled  towards  the  South-West  reaching  Italy  and  Northern 
Greece  between  9  and  11  May. 
Levels  of  surface  contamination  in  Member  States  by  the  most  important 
radionuclides.  namely  iodine-131  and  caesium  134/137.  as  reported  to  the 
Commission  by  national  administrations  following  the  accident  are 
illustrated in Figures  1  and  2. 
The  resulting  radiation  exposure  has  been  calculated(4)  for  the 
following  pathways: 
external radiation from  the cloud  and  deposited material; 
internal  irradiation  from  inhalation of  airborne material  during  the 
passage  of  the cloud 
internal irradiation from  ingestion of  contaminated  foodstuffs. 
The  la-tter  pathway  is the most  important. 
Dose  assessment  carried out  for  the  Commission  by  the Nntional 
Radiological Protection Board,  UK. -13-
Doses  have  been  estimated  for  three  representative  age-groups,  namely  the  1 
year-old  infant,  the  10  year-old  child  and  the  adult.  The  effects  on 
exposure of  countermeasures  taken by  the authorities were  taken into account; 
however,  the  reduction  in  dose  achieved  by  precautionary  measures  taken  by 
individual members  of the public  as  a  reaction to  the  contamination resulting 
from  Chernobyl is difficult to quantify and was  therefore neglected.  Table  2 
gives  the  individual  effective  doses  received  in  the  first  year  for  each  of 
the  three  age  categories  considered.  Table  3  gives  the  effective  dose 
received  over  a  lifetime  in  each  Member  State  for  the  average  adult.  The 
average  lifetime dose  ranges  from  0.3  ~sv to  610  ~sv.  It is  of  interest  to 
compare  the  above  doses with that received  from natural background  radiation, 
which  on  average over  a  lifetime amounts  to  some  130  mSv  (see Table  4). 
The  co·llective  effective  dose  equivalent  commitment  to 
population,  which  is  a  measure  of  the  potential  health 
exposure,  amounts  to about  85,000 man-Sv. 
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TABLE  2 
Average  Individual Effective Dose  Equivalents  in First Year  (1-1Sv) 
Infant  Child  Adult 
Belgium  no·  61  52 
Denmark  110  . 76  63 
France  81  55  51 
Germany  230  200  190 
Greece  420  420  370 
Ireland  130  100  100 
Italy  160  180  210 
Luxembourg  120  78  62 
Netherlands  89  -78  69 
Portugal  0.4  0.3  0.2 
Spain  2.7  1.6· ..  1 
United  Kingdom  56  38  35 
TABLE  3 
Average  Adult  Effective Dose  Equivalent  Commitments  (1-1Sv) 
{Integration over  SO .years) 
.........  ··'· 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
. Spain 
• United Kingdom 
TABLE  4 
n:· 
100 
88 
410 
610 
i7o 
370 
100 
no 
0~ 3': 
1.2 
49 
Annual  effective dose  equivalents in the Community 
from various  sources of  exposure 
Source  of  exposure 
Natural 
,-'  Medical 
Chernobyl  first year 
adult 
Effective dose  equivalent  (J..~Sv) 
In a  year 
1000  2000 . 
300  500 
0.2  -370 
Over  a  lifetime 
70.000  140,000 
21,000  35,000 
0.3  610 3.2.2.1.  Administrative Problems  of  Food  Contamination 
The  radioactivity  which  was  deposited  in  varying  amounts  over  the 
surface  of  Europe  contaminated  a  wide  range  of  agricultural  products. 
Plants  were  contaminated  by  direct  deposits  of  radionuclides  upon  their 
surface.  Animal  products  dairy  produce,  meat,  etc.  were 
contaminated  through  animal  consumption  of  contaminated  grass,  etc. 
Contaminated  agricultural  products  which  are used  for  human  consumption 
become  vehicles  for  exposure  of  man  to  radioactivity.  In  view  of  the 
potential  danger  in this  situation the  Community  system  for  rapid  alert 
in  cases  of  food  contamination  was  put  into  effect  on  2  May,  1986  and 
data  on  food  contamination  were  exchanged  on  a  daily  basis  between 
control  authorities.  Concern  over  foodstuffs  from  contaminated  areas, 
and  especially  imports  from  the  Soviet  Union  and  other  affected  Eastern 
European  countries,  led  to  the  imposition  by  national  authorities  of 
restrictions on  internal trade  and  on  imports. 
The  national  experts  on  food  contamination  met  on  5  May  together  with 
experts  in  trade  and  in  radiation  protection  and  on  the  basis  of  this 
consultation the  Commission: 
adopted  a  Recommendation  calling  on  Member  States  to  set  certain 
maximum  levels  for  radioactivity  in  milk,  in  milk  products,  and  in 
fruit  and vegetables; 
decided,  subject  to approval  of  the Standing Veterinary Committee,  to 
ban  the  importation. of  meat  and  live  arlimals  from  certain  Eastern 
European  countries  and  the Soviet Union; 
proposed  a  Council Regulation  to ban  imports  of  fruit  and  vegetables, 
milk  and  milk  products,  game  and  fresh  water  fish  from  Eastern 
European  countries  and  the Soviet Union. 
The  objective  of  these  actions  was  to  allow  Member  States  to  remove 
restrictions which had  been  imposed  on  internal trade and  to  take  common 
measures  on  imports  while  protecting  the health of  the  population.  The 
Commission  Decision  on  meat  and  live  animals  was  taken  on  May  7, 
covering  imports  of  more  than  70%  of  fresh  food  and  live  animal  imports 
from  the  countries  concerned.  On  May  12  the  Council  adopted  a 
Regulation  suspending  imports  of  other  foodstuffs.  At  the  same  time, 
the  Member  States  agreed  not  to  impose  on  imports  from  within  the 
Community  stricter  radioactivity  levels  than  those  pertaining  to  home 
products.  Both  the  Commission  Decision  and  Council  Regulation  were  to 
run until the  end  of  May. 
Subsequently,  the  alert  system  continued  to  operate  and  a  number  of 
meetings  of  experts  were  held  to  update  the  situation.  The  Group  of 
Experts  set  up  under  Article  31  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  to  advise  the 
Commission  on  radiation  protection  standards,  provided  a  provisional 
opinion on  the derived  reference level of  caesium in major  foodstuffs  in 
international  trade.  These  consultations  were  the  basis  for  the 
provisional  regulation  adopted  by  the  Council  on  30  May  to  replace  the 
import  ban  fixing  the  maximum  levels  of  caesium  134  and  137 
contamination in foodstuffs. -----------------------
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4.  RESPONSES  TO  CHERNOBYL 
4.1.  Soviet National Measures 
4.1.1.  Energy  Supply Policy 
It is the Soviet view that  the  Chernobyl  event ls altogether exceptional 
and  that  continuation  of  the  policy  to  expand  nuclear  power  is  not  in 
question.  Consistent  with  this  view,  the  Soviet  authorities  have 
already  resumed  operation  of  Unit  1  at  Chernobyl,  are  preparing  Unit  2 
to  resume  operation  and  will  be  attempting  to  recommission  Chernobyl 
Unit  3  once  entombment  of Unit  4  has  been completed. 
4.1.2.  Organisational Measures 
It  is  the  Soviet  view  that  the  nuclear  safety  standards  in  force  in. 
USSR  are  comparable  with  those  in  force  abroad,  appear  to  be  adequate 
and  do  not  require  revision.  However,  they  recognise · that  a  more 
·careful  verification  of  their  implementation  in  practice  is  necessary 
(training  and  retraining  of  operating  staff,  more  careful  quality 
assurance  audits  at  the  design  and  construction  phases,  etc.).  An 
All-Union Ministry of Nuclear  Power  has  been established and  a  number  of 
senior  officials  have  been  replaceci.  A  whole  range  of ·measures  to 
improve  State monitoring of_nuclear safety is also  to be  carried out. 
4.1.3.  Technical.Measures 
The  Soviet  authorities  have. announced  that  a  number  of  material  and 
procedural  changes  which  will  increase  the  ~afety of · operat'ion · of  RBMK 
reactors are being  implemented.  The  main actions are: 
improvement  of  instrumentation and  control equipment; 
revision and stricter enforcement  of administrative procedures; 
limitation  of  possible withdrawal  of  control  rods  from  the  core  such 
that the minimum  penetration is 1.2 metres .below  the  top of  the  core; 
change  of  the  reactor  operating  rules  _to  forbid  operation  with 
available  reactivity control  less  than  70-80  equivalent  control  rods 
(compared with  the  previous limit of  30). 
These  actions  can be  implemented without  bac~fitting which would  require 
extended  shutdown of  the  plant. 
In  the  longer  term,  it  is  planned  to  increase  the  level  of  enrichment 
·used  in  the  reactor  and  to  insert  neutron  absorbers  in  the  core  -
measures  which  are  intended  to  eliminate  the  present  positive  void 
coefficient of reactivity. -19-
After  the  accident,  the  status  of  theoretical  and  experimental  research 
on  nuclear  safety  in  the  USSR  has  been  reviewed.  Analyses  of  all 
possible  transients  and  accident  regimes,  including  conditions  not 
anticipated  at  the  design  stage,  are  in  progress.  More  extensive  use 
will  be  made  of  quantitative probabilistic analysis  of  safety.  (It may 
be  noted  that  the unstable characteristics of  the  RBMK  reactor,  to which 
the  short-term  remedial  measures  listed  above  are  addressed,  were  known 
to  the  Soviet  designers  in  1974  and  were  described  in  the  open 
literature in  1979.  As  regards  this  problem,  safety analysis  could  not 
add  appreciably  to  answers  of  the potential hazard.) 
4.2  Measures  in the  Framework of  the  European  Community 
Experience  of  the  immediate  post-accident  events  has  shown  the  need  for 
some  improvements  in  existing  procedures  and  facilities  for  alleviating 
and  reducing  the health effects and  stresses on  the population both in the 
Community  framework  and  in  individual  member  states.  A  variety  of 
measures  are  being  or  will  be  taken  to  respond  to  these  needs  - some  in 
the  Community  framework,  some  in the national setting. 
In  the  Framework  Communication,  the  Commission has  proposed  a  programme  of 
actions  and  studies lying in five main areas  : 
- Health protection 
- Safety of nuclear installations and  their operation 
- Emergency  procedures 
- Actions  in  conjunc~~on with third countries 
- Community  research 
a)  Health Protection 
The  Chernobyl  events  focused  attention upon  three  main  requirements  for 
health  protection  for  which  provisions  in  the  Community  need  to  be 
reviewed.  These  requirements  are  : 
(i)  for  measuring,  assessing  and  reporting  radioactivity  to  which 
citizens  may  be  exposed  in  accident  and  post-accident  situations; 
and,  in  particular,  for  monitoring  radioactive  contamination  and 
regulating  trade  in food; 
(ii)  for  medical  treatment  of  persons  suffering  immediate  medical 
effects of accidental radioactive release; 
(iii)  for  decontamination  of  living  and  working  areas  affected  by 
post-accident  contamination. ·'  I 
1.~ 
(5) 
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'f'hL•  <:onnnltu:don  hau  undt!rtaken  rec~ul.ly  an  exuminat.Lon  of  curr··~nt 
Conununity  instruments  and  measures  relevant  to  radiological  protection. 
This  was  in part  prompted  by  incidents  and  accidents  that  occurred  over 
the  last  few  years,  but  mainly  brought  about  by  events  following  the 
Chernobyl  accident.  As  announced  in  its  Framework  Communication,  the 
Commission  has  concluded  that  existing  measures  for  the  application  of 
Chapter III are  in need  of  review. 
The  experience  gained  and  the  lessons  learnt  from  this  review  are 
reflected  in  the  Commission  Communication  to  the  Council  COM  (86)  434 
(The  development  of  Connnunity  measures  for  the  application  of  Chapter 
III of  the  Euratom Treaty- "Health and  Safety").  In that document,  the 
principle  lines  of  action  relevant  to  the  accident  and  post-accident 
situations,  such as  Chernobyl,  are: 
application  of  effective 
the  assimilation  of  the 
should  be  accelerated: 
this end. 
and  uniform  radiation  safety  standards: 
Euratom  basic  standards  into  national  law 
the  Commission  will  use  every  endeavour  to 
establishment  of  a  rapid  information  system  for  timely  reporting  of 
levels  of  radioactivity  in  the  event  of  radiologically  important 
incidents  inside  or  outside  the  Community:  The  Commission  is 
preparing proposals. 
estabiishment  of  suitable  arrangements  for 
assistance  in the  event  of.nuc.t'ear accidents: 
to make  proposals. 
provision  of  mutual 
the  Commission  intends · 
The  arrangements  already  in  place  at  the  time  of  Chernobyl  for 
monitoring  and  regulating  trade  in  edible  goods,  notably  agricultural 
products,  have been widely acknowledged  to be  inadequate  to  face  such an 
abnormal  situation.  In  recognition  of  this,  the  Commission  is  deeply 
engaged  in  consideration  of  various  possible  improvements.  To  clarify 
the  scientific  elements  of  the  problem,  the  group  of  experts, 
constituted  under  Article  31  of  the  EURATOM  Treaty,  has  developed 
guidance  on  the  derived  reference  levels  of  contamination  of  food:  at 
the  same  time,  the  Commission  has  sought  the  views  of  an  ad-hoc 
committee  of experts  on current  implementation of basic safety standards 
and  derived  reference  levels.  These  elements  will  be  combined  with 
considerations  of  administrative  aspects  in  the  Commission  preparation 
of draft regulations which it will be  putting  forward  before  the  end  of 
1986. 
The  existing  food  regulations  referred  to  in  Section  3.2.2.1  have  been 
extended until 28  February  1987.  Monthly  reports are being made  to  the 
Commission  by  the  Member  States  on  their  import  controls  and  these  are 
distributed  to all control services in the  Community. 
As  regards  provision  of  medical  treatment  for  victims  of  nuclear 
accidents,  the principal responsibilities reside with  the  governments  of 
those  Member  States  which  conduct  nuclear  operatif.~f.  The  Community, 
through  the  Radiation Protection Research  Programme  ,  contributes  to 
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the  common  stock of  medical  knowledge  available  to  guide  physicians  and 
surgeons  in  the  treatment  of  accident  victims.  A  review  of  topics  and 
priorities  within  the  existing  programme  has  been  carried  out  in  light 
of  the  Chernobyl  experience  and  desirable  changes  have  been  identified. 
This  review  has  been  discussed  with  the  appropriate  CGC  and  with  the 
EURATOM  Scientific  and  Technical Committee.  The  Commission is currently 
examining  the  extent  to  which  these  changes  should  be  translated  into 
proposals  for revision of  the current  research programme. 
As  regards  provisions  for  decontamination  of  areas  which  might  be 
affected  if  a  severe  accident  were  to  occur  within  the  Community, 
responsibility  lies <~fth  national  governments "(7) Some  themes  in  the 
radiation  protection  and  the  decommissioning  research  programmes 
are  yielding  useful  contributions  to  the  common  stock  of  knowledge  of 
methods  and  problems. 
b)  Safety of Nuclear  Installations and  their Operation 
The  Commission  and  Member  States  participated  in  the  post-accident 
review  meeting  in  Vienna  25/29  August  1986  and  in  the  ensuing  special 
session  of  the  IAEA  General  Conference.  The  information  exchanged  and 
the  policy  considerations  illuminated  in  those  discussions  are 
ingredients of  the  Commission  consideration of future  actions  in the 
field  of  safety  of  nuclear  installations.  As  announced  in  the  Framework 
Communication,  the  Commission will  report  on  the  Council  resolution  of  22 
July  1975  relative .to  the  technological problems  of  nuclear safety. 
The  Commission is also  giving consideration to  the  following  problems 
whether  provisions  of  the  EURATOM  basic  standards  which  cover 
industrial  preventive  measures  are  correctly  applied  and  sufficient 
for  the protection and  information of  the  public; 
the  question  of  whether  emission  standards  based  on  the  concept  of 
the  best available  technology not  involving excessive costs should  be 
applied  to nuclear installations; 
and  will  come  forward  with  a  communication  or  communications  in  due 
course. 
The  Commission  also  intends  to  make  proposals  before  the  end  of  1986  on 
the  following: 
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implementation of  a  mandatory  system of  incident  reporting; 
legislation  concerning  transport  of  dangerous  materials,  including 
uniform standards of  training for  transport workers. 
c)  Emergency  Procedures/Plans 
. 
The  Commission  will  explore  with  national  authorities  possible  further 
needs  for  Community  provisions  in  the  field  of  mutual  assistance  and 
other  common  elements  of  emergency  management,  taking  into  account  the 
situation  created  by  the  adoption  of  the  IAEA  ·convention  on  mutual 
assistance  (see  Section 5.2). 
d)  International Actions 
The  principal  international  actions  to  respond  to  the  Chernobyl  event 
are  pursued in the  framework  of  the  IAEA  and  are described more  fully in 
Section  5.  In  addition,  the  Commission  is  preparing  a  proposal  for 
Community  adhesion  to  the  London  Convention  on  the  prevention of  marine 
pollution  by  dumping  of  wastes  and  other matter.  This  proposal will be 
put  forward before the  end  of  1986. 
e)  Research 
Both  the  Commission's  own  reflections  and  the  report  of  the  IAEA 
post~accident review meeting  point  to  the  need  for  an  adaptation of  the 
Community  research  programmes  in  the  fields  pertinent  to  the  safety·and 
health  effects  of  nuclear  operations.  Analysis  of  .·the  implications  of 
the  Chernobyl  event  is  in  progress  with  the  intention  of  drawing  up 
specific  proposals  by  end  1986.  Among  the  areas  of  research  which  are 
under  examination  are  modelling  of  human  behaviour,  techniques  and 
applications  of  probabilistic  reliability .analysis,  severe  accident 
phenomena,  techniques  and  systems  for  accident  management,  design 
concepts  for  benign  reactors,  modelling  and  analysis  of  long  range 
transport of  radioactivity,  techniques  for  post-expo~ures dosimetry,  and 
study of  the  immediate  and  late radiological consequences  of Chernobyl. -23-
5.  INTERNATIONAL  ACTIONS  IN  THE  IAEA  FRAMEWORK 
5.1  General 
Vl~ry  Hoon  after  the  Chernobyl  acd dtmt,  Lhe  IAI'~A  became  the  pr Lncipa1 
forum  ln  dealing  with  international  aspects.  In  early  May  the  Western 
Economic  Summit  took  place.  It  discussed  Chernobyl  and  issued  a 
declaration  weifoming  the  work  of  the  IAEA  and  urging  it  to  improve 
international  cooperation  on  the  safety  of  nuclear  installations,  the 
handling  of  nuclear  accidents  and  their  consequences  and  the  provision of 
mutual  emergency  assistance. 
Subsequently,  at  a  special  Governing  Board  meeting  of  the  IAEA  on  21  May 
it was  decided  to  : 
(a)  hold  within  three  months  - a  meeting  of  experts  to  examine  in  detail 
the  cause  and  the  sequence of events during  the  Chernobyl accident; 
(b)  convene  an  expert  group with  the  aim of  transforming  the existing  IAEA 
guidelines  on  rapid  information  exchange  and  mutual  emergency 
assistance  into binding international conventions; 
(c)  established  an  expert  working  group  to  consider  additional  measures 
to  improve  cooperation  in  the  field  of  nuclear  safety,  including  ways 
and  means  of further  refining nuclear safety standards; 
(d)  hold  an  intergovernmental  conference  in  order  to  consider  the  full 
range  of nuclear safety issues. 
Three  out  of  four  of  these  activities  have  already  taken  place  with 
Community  participation.  Experts,  meeting  between  21  July  and  15  August, 
succeeded  in  establishing  draft  texts  for  the  two  conventions  (rapid 
information  exchange  and  mutual  emergency  assistance).  The  post  accident 
review  meeting  took  place  in  Vienna  from  25-29  August.  The  outcomes  of 
both  of  these  expert  meetings  were  discussed  at  the  special  session  at 
ministerial  level  of  the  IAEA  General  Conference  in  Vienna  from  24-26 
September. 
For  some  time  the  Commission  and  the  IAEA  have  been  developing  broad 
cooperations  in  the  fields  of  nuclear  safeguards  and  nuclear  research  and 
training,  the  latter  particularly  in  the  areas  of  waste  management, 
safety,  fusion,  transport,  etc. 
The  Commission  formally  takes part in the  IAEA  General  Conference  and  thus 
is naturally associated with  IAEA  actions  following  Chernobyl.  It intends 
to  take  an  active  part  in  the  forthcoming  IAEA  activities  on  nuclear 
safety. \  .  ~ 
5.2.  The  Conventions  on  Early Notification of  a  Nuclear Accident  and  on 
Assistance  in the  Case  of  a  Nuclear Accident  or Radiological 
Emergency 
The  convention on  early notification relates  to  accidents having actual or 
potential  trans-boundary  effects  and  arising  from  nuclear  operations. 
State parties undertake  to  provide  prompt  notification  to  the  IAEA  and  to 
other  state  parties  regarding  any  accident  which  has  affected  or  may 
affect  those state parties:  this latter notification may  be  direct or via 
the  IAEA.  Other  state parties,  not  affected  by  the  accident,  may  request 
to  receive  the  notified  information  from  .the  IAEA.  Each  notification  is 
to  include details of accident  location,  radiation release,  meteorological 
information,  monitoring  information  relative  to  trans-boundary  effects, 
etc.,  and  is  to  be  updated  at appropriate  intervals.  Each  state party is 
to  designate its relevant authorities  and  points of  contact.  · o 
The  convention on assistance provides  a  framework  for  the organisation and 
provision of assistance by state parties and/or  the  IAEA  to  any  requesting 
state party,  in the  event  of  a  nuclear accident or radiological emergency, 
whether  or  not  the  incident  has  occurred  on  the  territory  of  the 
requesting  state  party.  Each  assisting  s.tate  party·  may,  at  its 
discretion,  offer  its  assistance  on  the  basis  of  full,  partial  or  null 
riembursement.  Each  state party is to designate its competent authorities 
and  points of  contact. 
5.3.: The  Results of  the  IAEA  Special General Conference 
At  the  special  General  Conference  2·4-26 'September  the  above-mentioned 
conventions  on  notification  and  on  assistance  were  adopted.  All  Member 
States  of  the  Community  have  signed  the  former;  all but  one  have  signed 
the  latter.  The  Conference  also  adopted  a  resolution  on  nuclear  safety, 
recognising  that  nuclear  energy  will  continue  to  be  an  important  energy 
source  for  economic  and  social  development.  All  countries,  including 
those who  have  rejected  the use  of nuclear power,  upheld  this resolution. 
The  special General  Conference  also  took note  of  the  post  accident  review 
report  prepared by  the International Nuclear  Safety Advisory Group  (INSAG) 
on  the  basis  of  the  presentation  and  discussion  which  took  place  during 
the  25-29  August  meeting,  supplemented  by  subsequent  debate  and  expert 
analysis.  The  INSAG  report,  while  drawing  attention  to  some  remaining 
areas  of  uncertainty,  largely  confirms  the validity of  the  Soviet  account 
of  the  accident  sequences  and  presents  views  agreed  between  INSAG  members 
and  Soviet  experts  on  the  probable  mechanisms  of  some  previously 
unexplained  elements  of  the  original  Soviet  description  of  the  accident 
seq~ence.  In  the  light  of  the  discussions  which  took  place  in  the  post 
accident  review  meeting  and  of  further  expert  analysis,  the  INSAG  report 
includes  a  series of observations  and  recommendations  relating to  a  number 
of  reactor safety and  radiation protection topics.  These  observations  and 
recommendations  are  to  be  taken  into  account  by  the  lAEA  Board  of 
Governors  in  the  future  development  of  the  lAEA  programme  of  work.  Many 
of  the  topics  have  counterparts  in  the  nuclear  and  health  protection 
activities  pursued  at  Community  level  and  the  Commission  intends  to 
promote  the  closest  possible  cooperation  with  activities  nn  tiwse  topics 
which  may  be  instituted by  the  IAEA. -25-
6.  ISSUES  FOR  THE  FUTURE 
The  effects  of  the  Chernobyl  accident  still persist  and  many  actions  which 
have  been  launched  in--- consequence  are  in  progress.  This  report  surveys 
events  over  the  first  five  months  after  the  accident  and,  within  this  time 
frame,  only  those  aspects  directly  related  to  the  accident  event.  Many 
conclusions  have  been  suggested  regarding  the  various  technical  and 
administrative  questions  encountered  but  in  most  cases  such  conclusions  are 
premature  in relation to  the necessary supporting analyses. 
In  the  following,  an  attempt  is  made  of  listing  the  issues  which  deserve 
special  attention , for  the  future,  taking  into  account  in  particular  the 
international  nature  of  nuclear  safety  and  the  unique  potential  of  the 
European  Community  to  contribute  to  this  international  analysis.  The 
achievement  of  the  best  possible  approaches  to  safe  design,  construction and 
operation of nuclear installations,  the provision of  the essential assurances 
to  the  public  of  the  adequacy  of  nuclear  safety,  the  monitoring  of  the 
effects  of  any  major  nuclear  accident  and  the  efficient  management  of 
measures  needed  to  deal-with  large  scale  incidents  such  as  Chernobyl  are all 
matters  in  which .  the  ingredient  of  international  cooperation  is 
indispensable.  This  is  again  a  field  in which  the  European  Community  has  a 
unique potential to contribute. 
a)  What  Was  the Cause  of  the Accident? 
The  prime  cause  of  . the  accident  was  a  combination  of  violations  of 
instructions  and  operating  rules  committed  by  the  staff  of  the  unit, 
compounded  by  specific features of behaviour of  RBMK  reactors.  The  result 
was  a  fast  reactivity  excursion  culminating  in  an  extremely  rapid  power 
surge  and  a  major  core disruptive accident. 
The  reactor  and  associated plant behaved  in an entirely predictable manner 
during  the run-up  to  the test and  no  new  unknown  phenomena  occurred before 
or  after  the  accident.  The  unfavourable  characteristics  of  thr  RBMK 
reactors  in respect  of  dynamic  instability were  known  to  the  designers  in 
1974  and  were  published  in  1977.  Explanations  for  the  unorthodox 
behaviour  of  the  operators  and  for  the  ease  with  which  so  many  essential 
reactor  protection  circuits  could  be  interfered  with  or  disabled  at  the 
one  time  are still lacking. 
In  the  relatively  older  philosophy  of  the  RBMK  reactor  safety  protection 
system,  more  reliance  is  placed  on  proper  operator  action  than  on 
automatic  safety  circuits.  Thus  the  fast  reactivity  excursion  was  not 
automatically terminated  immediately. 
b)  Have  Steps  Been  Taken  to Prevent its Repetition? 
As  described  in  Section  4.1. 3.,  the  Soviet  authorities  are  introducing  a 
number  of  modifications  to  reinforce  the  level  of  safety  of  existing  and 
future  RBMK  reactors. 
It  was  stated  by  the  Soviet  representatives  that  further  measures  are 
being studied,  e.g.  the  provision of  fast-acting  shutdown devices. -26-
There  is,  as  yet,  no  evidence  of  a  move  to  implement  the  "defence  in 
depth"  philosophy  of  modern  nuclear  reactor  safety  design  which  requires 
that  manual  actions  of  operators  are  overruled  by  the  automatic  safety 
systems when  the safety of  the plant is seriously threatened. 
Taken  together  with  the  altogether  singular  character  of  the  events 
leading  to  the  Chernobyl  accident,  the  measures  being  implemented  will 
make  it  extremely  unlikely  that  there  will  be  a  repetition  of  the 
accident. 
c)  Could  Such  an Accident  Occur in the  Community? 
Insofar  as  there  are  no  nuclear  power  plants  in  the  Community  displaying 
the  unfavourable  stability  characteristics  of  the  RBMK  reactors  and 
insofar  as  criteria  for  segregation  of  safety  functions  and  safety 
circuits are  entirely different  in  the  Community,  such  an  accident  cannot 
be  considered  as  a  precursor  or  as  a  warning  of specific relevance  to  the 
Community.  However,  the  Chernobyl  accident  has  re-emphasised  some  of  the 
lessons  of  the  Three  Mile  Island  accident,  i.e.  the  importance  of  the 
human  factor  and  man-machine  interface,  the  value  of  properly  conceived 
and  built  containment  and  the  need  to  consider  a  .very  wide  range  of 
conc.eivable  events  when  evaluating  design  safety  and  possible  accident 
consequences. 
Serious  reactor  accidents  in  the  Community,  or  indeed  elsewhere,  are  not 
impossible·  by .. definition.  Their  probability  of  occurrence  is,  however, 
very  low.  Ver'y  great  attention' is  given  to  reducing  this  probability  to 
extremely  low  levels  and  to  ensuring  that  the  consequences  of  such  an 
event  are at a  minimum.  As  regards  the  human  factor,  operator training in 
all Community  countries  is  long  and  rigorous.  In addition,  system design 
includes  automatic  negation  of  operator  actions  which  could  threaten 
reactor safety. 
d)  Is  There  Scope  for  Improving  Current  Levels  of  Assurance  of  Safety  of 
Nuclear  Installations? 
There  are  four  broad  categories  of  actions  which  could  improve  the 
assurance  of safety of nuclear installations: 
(i)  exchanging  information  and  making  intercomparisons  between 
countries  concerning  the  safety  philosophies  and  approaches  and 
safety  criteria  and  guidelines  for  the  design  and  licensing  of 
nuclear  installations.  The  resulting  process  of  analysis  and  the 
diversity  of  scrutiny  of  the  various  approaches  tends  to  ensure 
that  potentially  severe  sequences  of  events  have  not  been  over-
looked.  Each  party can learn from  the other and  the countries with 
the  smaller  or  incipient  nuclear  programmes  can  benefit  from  the 
strength of  knowledge  and  experience  of  the others. 
(ii)  The  present  population of  reactors  in  the  world  c0mpriRes  react§fS 
of  different  design,  sizes  and  operational  experience  . 
Periodical safety reviews  on  individual reactors or  class~s thereof 
(S)  It is to  be  noted  that major nuclear accidents  (Windscale,  Tin:ee  Hile 
Island,  Chernobyl)  have befallen comparatively new  reactors. -"LI-
·-.·should  be  conducted  using  the  most  up-to-date  methodologies  J 
including Probabilistic  Safety Assessment,  in order  to  check  their 
safety  performance,  to  identify  the  possible  needs  for  backfitting 
and  to  help  taking  decisions  about  withdrawal  from  service.  A 
major advantage  in performing Probabilistic Safety Assessments  lies 
in  the  opportunity  that  these  exercises  offer  to  identify 
potentially  dangerous  sequences  of  events  so  far  overlooked  and 
weak  points of  the design. 
The  use  of  Probabilistic  Safety  Assessment  should  be  encouraged. 
Its  benefit  could  be  enhanced  by  exchanging  information  upon  the 
methodologies  and  the results of  the safety reviews. 
(iii)  The  human  factor,  both  in  the  phase  of  design  and 
construction and  in the phase  of operation of nuclear installations 
plays a  major role in achieving safety.  Expert  teams  of scientists 
and  engineers  have  been  created  and  maintained  by  the  utilities, 
the  reactor  constructors,  the  licensing  authorities  and  the. 
research  organisations  to  support  the  steadily  expanding  nuclear 
programmes  over the last 25  years.  These  human  resources,  together 
with  the  laboratories  and  facilities  for  safety  research  are  the 
foundations  upon  which  continuing  safe·  performance  of  nuclear 
installations -is  built.  These  assets  must  be  preserved  and,  where 
necessary,  upgraded. 
Although  . ,the  world  collectively  possesses  the  capability  to 
maintain  th~~ necessary ..  h;i~~  standards  and  the  human  resources  to 
pursue  the  safe  exploitation  of  .nuclear  energy  for  peaceful 
purposes,  th.e distribution of these assets is ·not  uniform among  all 
countries.  Technological exchanges  across  regions  should  therefore 
be  encouraged  in the field of safety of nuclear installation in the 
interest of  the international community. 
(iv)  As  was  vividly  illustrated  by  the  events  of  Chernobyl, 
interferences  both  with  the  normal  pattern  of  operation · of  a 
nuclear  plant  and  with  the  engineering  elements  of  a  plant  safety 
systems  can  have  seriously  adverse  effects.  The  designs  of  plant 
operational  procedures  and  of  plant  safety  systems  should  be  such 
that  interferences  with  the  normal  operating  modes  are  extremely 
difficult to achieve. 
e)  Is Medical Knowledge  Adequate  for Provision of Immediate  Medical  Care? 
Clinicians  and  scientists  in  the  Community  have  the  experience  and 
facilities  to  diagnose  and  treat victims  of  radiation accidents  according 
to  the  best  available  state  of  art,  and  the  management  and  treatment  of 
several  accident  victims  has  been  handled  efficiently  in  Europe  in  the 
past.  An  important  aspect  in  the  treatment  of  such  persons  is  the  close 
cooperation  between  specialists  from  different  disciplines.  The  careful 
study  of  the  Chernobyl  victims  and  the  follow-up  of  these  lessons  will 
certainly improve  further diagnostics  and  treatment methods  for victims of 
radiation  accidents.  An  effort  must  be  made  to  maintain  such  competence 
into the  future. -28-
Dealing  with  a  large  number  of  victims  may  present  problems  for  which 
plans  should  be  made  in  advance.  Recommended  treatment  schedules  taking 
into  account  the  Chernobyl  experience  should  be  developed,  clinical  teams 
should  be  selected  and  trained,  and  structures  for  a  rapid  and  efficient 
manageme~t of  patients  should  be  foreseen.  Particular attention should be 
paid  to  the  optimal  treatment  of persons  suffering from both radiation and 
conventional burns  in addition to radiation. 
Some  . additional  efforts  might  also  be  devoted  to  improving  decision 
criteria for  bone  marrow  transplantation and  to  techniques  for  the  removal 
of incorporated radionuclides  from  the body. 
f)  What  Lessons  Can  Be  Learned  Regarding  Protection  of  the  Public  near  the 
Site of  a  Nuclear Accident? 
Detailed plans  for  local emergency  countermeasures after nuclear accidents 
must  be well prepared and  up-to-date having  regard  to  the possible gravity 
of  a  situation  and  to  the  problems  arising  near  national  and  Comm.unity 
frontiers.  The  Soviet  experience  clearly  illustrated  the  benefit  of 
strong  central  control  of  the  numerous  coordinated  measures  which  may  be 
necessary.  The  Commission  had  previously·  organised  a  review  of 
transfrontier  emergency  planning  and  has  now  embarked  on  a  process  of 
consultation  of  national  authorities  on  the  problems  of  emergency 
management  in the  light of  the  Chernobyl events. 
In  view  of  the  major ·social  and.  ec.onomic  upheaval  experienced  by  the 
citizens of  the Chernobyl  region,  it may  be  that ·the risks  and  benefits of 
grave  countermeasures  which  might  be  needed  after  a  nuclear  (and  other 
serious)  accident  need  to  be  studied  in  the  light  of  the  Chernobyl 
experience  taking  into  account  the  specific  social  and  administrative 
structures in Member  States of  the Community. 
g)  What  are  Likely  to  be  the  Long  Term  Effects  on  the  Health  of  Community 
Citizens? 
With  increasing  distance  from  the  accident  site,  exposure  of  persons  and 
contamination  levels  diminished,  and  there  were  certainly no  acute  health 
effects to persons  in the  European  Community.  In order  to  reduce  possible 
lorig-term  health  effects  in  the  Community,  only  a  limited  range  of 
countermeasures was  required  in Member  States of the  Comm.unity. 
The  long-term health impact  from  the Chernobyl accident  in terms  of cancer 
and  genetic  damage  is  very  small  compared  to  th~t  arising  from  other 
sources  and,  in particular,  from  natural  radiation.  The  studies  referred 
to  in  3. 2. 2.  yield  an  estimate  of  about  1000  potential  additional  deaths 
from  cancer  over  the  next  70  years,  which  is  to  be·  compared  with  a  total 
of  about  60  million  fatal  cancers  from  all  other.  causes  over  the  same 
period.  Further  refinements  of this estimate will be  obtained  from  future assessments  using  better  databases.  On  present  dose  estimates,  it would 
appear  that  epidemiological investigations designed  to detect  any relative 
increase  in  malignant  and  genetic  disease  due  to  Chernobyl,  would  be 
impracticable  to  undertake· in  the  scale  and  extent  required  to  yield 
statisitically reliable results. 
g)  How  was  the Dispersion of Radioactive Material in  the  Community  Assessed? 
A  widespread  and  rather  heterogeneous  contamination  of  the  territory  of 
the  Community  occurred  as  a  consequence of  the  radioactivity released  from 
Chernobyl.  The  Member  States  deployed  their  existing  infrastructures 
to  measure  environmental  contamination,  to  assess  doses  to  the  population 
and  to  take  appropriate  countermeasures.  Existing  techniques  and 
facilities  permitted  a  rough  estimate  of  the  environmental  impact.  Based 
upon  this  experimental  data,  available  real  time  assessment  methods  were 
successfully  applied  in  the  Member  States  and  proved  to  be  valuable  for 
immediate  emergency  management  and  for  forecasting  deposition  patterns. 
}lore  emphasis  needs  to  be  given  to  local  and  regional  aspects  in  such 
models. 
Existing  models  for  atmospheric  dispersion  are  now  being  validated  and 
embodied  into  a  probabilistic  risk  assessment  structure  to  serve  as  an 
essential  input  for  predicting  consequences  of  accidental  releases. 
Improvement  is  needed,  in  particular,  with  respect  to  a  more  rapid 
verification and utilisation of measurement  data  in such models  as well as 
the  consideration  of  local  and  regional  meteorological  conditions. 
Ongoing  research,  e.g.  in  the  project  "Methods  for  Assessing  the 
Radiological  Impact  of  Accidents"  (MARIA)  wi'll  take  into  account  the 
experience  of  Chernobyl  and  render  the  models  more  comprehensive  and  more 
rapid  for  both  Community-scale  and  local-scale  accident  situations  and 
will  attempt  to  help  decision-making  on  countermeasures  by  introducing 
some  representation  of  the  possible  health,  social  and·  economic 
consequences. 
h)  What  Lessons  can  be  Learned  About  Food-chain Transfer 
Transfer  of  radioactivity  into  the  human  food  chain  occurs  most  rapidly 
for  iodine  131  via  a  contamination  of  vegetables  and  milk.  Later,  the 
long-lived  caesium  isotopes  in meat,  dairy products,  vegetables  and  grains 
become  the  limiting  factor  and  contribute  most  to  the  long-term  dose. 
Models  available  for  calculating these  transfer processes have  been  shown, 
in  general,  to  be  valid  in  the  Chernobyl  situation  although  a  few 
unforeseen effects were  noted  in environmental or  food  transfer.  The  role 
of natural ecosystems  such as  forests  as  storage sites of  radioactivity is 
a  significant  feature  of  the  Chernobyl  situation:  the  phenomena  and 
mechanisms  involved  have  not  been  adequately  considered  in  the  past.  The 
influence  of  processing  and  cooking  and  the  application  of  these 
procedures  for  reducing  radioactivity in food  require more  attention.  The 
large  amount  of measurement  data collected in the  course  of monitoring  and 
regulating  food  quality  requires  better  processes  of  verification  and 
harmonisation  in the  future. 